The Big Society - Not Just a Harmless Gimmick

Every Government likes to have some sort of underlying theme. The motivation behind Margaret Thatcher's administration was always economic liberalism and the maximisation of individual freedom, even at the expense of social cohesion. Tony Blair wanted to govern from the 'radical centre' with the idea of making public services better by opening them up to competition and market forces. The central policy direction of this Government is undoubtedly David Cameron's idea of the 'Big Society'.

Perhaps the biggest problem with the 'Big Society' is that no-one really knows what it means. My interpretation of Mr Cameron's speeches is that it seems to refer to an emphasis on volunteer groups and individuals taking over public services. Indeed, one of the key intellectual contributors to the Big Society, Philip Blond, has often spoken of it encompassing worker co-operatives and other mutual means of ownership.

Not many people object to the goals of the Big Society. Everyone would like to see more people volunteering. The bonds of social commitment are inevitably strengthened where people willingly decide to give up their free time to help those less fortunate than themselves. Worker co-operatives would also be supported, especially on the left-of the political spectrum.

So why am I so uneasy about the Big Society?

My problem is that Mr Cameron is trying to pull the wool over people's eyes. The Comprehensive Spending Review resulted in a 28% cut in the local government budget. This represents a huge reduction in spending on local services. Councils are under a statutory duty to provide certain essential services, such as education and transport. In addition, many Councils are actively involved in the promotion of other projects, such as youth work and mental health support. They carry out these additional services by receiving modest central government funding. Given the whopping cut in the local government budget, the time is up for these extra facilities. There is simply no way in which a local authority will be able to maintain additional services in addition to their statutory commitments when faced with a 28% cut in funding.

This is why senior charity figures, such as Dame Suzi Leather, Chair of the Charity Commission, and Dame Elisabeth Hoodless, Chair of Community Service Volunteers, have argued so forcefully that Mr Cameron's Big Society agenda is a sham. How on Earth are people going to be able to effectively volunteer if the financial support is not there? For example, as a result of the Government's cuts, many libraries are being forced to close. As Dame Elisabeth asked, how are people supposed to volunteer in the local library if it is being closed down?

These are the uncomfortable questions about the Big Society that Mr Cameron cannot answer. The truth is that his destructive cuts package is wrecking any chance of a genuine culture of volunteering and civic engagement developing in this country.

Conservatives have sought to blame the need for the massive cuts in public spending on the last Labour Government. Here again, therefore, we see the great lie of British politics. I have argued against this before but just in case anyone is any doubt: Labour did not cause the banking crisis. The bankers caused the banking crisis.

The fact of the matter is that before 2007, when the financial meltdown began, Britain had the second lowest debt in the G7. So it's false to say that the Labour Government's reckless overspending created the deficit. Furthermore, up to this point, the Conservatives pledged to match Labour's spending plans. So they didn't think it was reckless overspending either. The other governing party, the Liberal Democrats, were actually in favour of increasing public spending. Any claim by the Government that the deficit is the product of years of Labour indulgence with the public finances is consequently (a) wrong, and (b) hypocritical.

Why did we end up with the largest debt after the financial crisis? The answer is simple. Britain was the most reliant on revenues from the financial services sector in the City of London. When the City went into sharp decline, so unfortunately did the entire British economy. The Government was forced to spend millions bailing out the banks while hundreds of businesses collapsed as a result of being unable to benefit from credit supplied by financial institutions. The Labour Government should take some blame for putting all our economic eggs in one basket by being so dependent on financial services. However, both main parties were to blame for this, none more so than the Tories who began diverting resources towards the City and away from manufacturing in the 1980s.

Mr Cameron is undermining his own Big Society by his massive cuts agenda. His ideological commitment to shrinking the state will always come before his desire to support civic engagement. He is seeking to convince people that he would love to see more volunteers but he has to clean up Labour's mess. Don't believe him.

Why We Need Strasbourg

Arrogant. Smug. Self-satisfied. These are all adjectives that could be used to describe John Hirst, the principal campaigner for the rights of convicted prisoners to vote in UK elections. Hirst was convicted of killing his landlady back in 1979 with an axe. Despite only receiving a 15 year tariff, Hirst went on to serve 25 years after committing a number of violent offences in jail. Following his release in 2004, he has made it his life's ambition to secure the right to vote for jailed offenders.

Anyone that has heard Hirst give interviews will no doubt be repulsed by his sense of entitlement. He is a man who has committed one of the most unconscionable crimes in society but nevertheless feels free to demand rights and privileges on the same basis as law-abiding citizens. Particular revulsion can be attributed to Hirst's description of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), ruling the UK's blanket ban on prisoners voting to be unlawful, as 'his' judgment. For all his cocky remarks, however, Hirst has made one solid point. Public opinion is absolutely irrelevant in upholding human rights.

If you talk to members of the judiciary, most will frankly admit that public opinion is a consideration when decisions are made. This is particularly so in sentencing in criminal justice, where many judges are afraid of being seen as 'soft on crime' by passing a lenient sentence. The extent to which public opinion should be a legitimate factor in ordinary judicial decision making is debatable. What is clear, however, is that the views of the majority should have no impact in the interpretation and application of human rights.

This is so because human rights are about the protection of the individual against the state. The very reason the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was founded in 1950 was to ensure that individuals had binding protection against the tyranny of the majority, which had been so clearly dominant in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Majoritarian views cannot and should not alter fundamental human rights. Accepting that principle sometimes involves taking unpopular decisions like letting suspected terrorists walk free on the streets, or allowing people like Hirst to visit the ballot box alongside decent citizens.

It is very difficult for domestic judges to remain insulated from public opinion. Lord Phillips, President of the Supreme Court, recently claimed that judges were totally detached from the political arena and made decisions entirely according to the law. This is clearly false, as a cursory glance of the law reports in the area of human rights will reveal to you. Judges of different political persuasions can differ markedly on issues of liberty and security. Whenever a significant ruling is made by the Supreme Court it is almost inevitable that the members of the court will have considered the front-page implications the next day. They are first and foremost British lawyers, who have grown up in British society with British morals and values.

Human rights, by their very nature, are universal. A person's right to a fair trial should be the same whether he is in England or Saudi Arabia. As a result, there cannot be any scope for the tailoring of human rights to particular national concerns. It is true that states, under the ECHR, have a 'margin of appreciation', within which they can make their own judgments on aspects of human rights law. However, this margin is clearly circumscribed so as to prevent individual states denying people fundamental liberties, such as the right to vote in elections.

As such, it is essential that there is some checking mechanism to ensure that individual countries respect the key principles of the ECHR. A right-leaning think tank recently called for the UK to remove itself from the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, claiming that it was unable to understand the particular morals and norms of the UK in certain areas. However, the peculiar characteristics of nation states should be an irrelevant factor in applying human rights law. In order to guarantee compliance with the Convention it is necessary, therefore, to have an independent tribunal in place to consider a case without all the pressure and scrutiny involved in domestic proceedings.

Judges in Strasbourg are far less likely to take into account the views of the British public when making rulings about the provisions of the ECHR. Jack Straw, writing in The Times, has used this is an argument for refusing to abide by the ECtHR's judgment on votes for prisoners. By contrast, this is exactly why we should submit to its jurisdiction and accept its rulings with good grace. Domestic judges, for all their independence and intelligence, are inevitably more liable to be swayed by majoritarian tendencies than those from different countries, backgrounds and cultures. This is an invaluable safeguard in human rights cases, where the only bulwark between tyranny and freedom may be a person in a gown sitting in a court.

Law, Love and Marriage

The most senior family judge in England and Wales this week called for unmarried co-habiting couples to be given the same rights on separation as divorcing spouses. Sir Nicholas Wall, President of the Family Division of the High Court, argued that those who have lived together in a relationship should have entrenched legal rights governing the distribution of property when they break up. His intervention is the latest contribution in a debate that has vexed family and property lawyers for some time now.

When married couples get divorced, both parties are entitled to a share of the marital assets. Usually, this will involve taking a percentage of the value of the family home. Each party's share is based on a number of complex factors but the general rule is that both are entitled to equal division.

The historical position in relation to unmarried co-habitees is that there has been no rights for either party to make claims on the other following separation. This has changed in recent years following the ruling of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden (2007). In this case, the House of Lords held that when co-habiting partners are the joint legal owners of the family home, but have not made any express declaration in relation to their beneficial interests, there is a presumption that both parties own the house in equal shares.

Therefore, if you register property in joint names, the starting point is you both have 50% ownership. This is the case even if one person has bought the house outright. That party would need to show that he or she had made an exceptionally high contribution in order to justify departing from the equal division principle.

As a result of this, I was surprised to see Sir Nicholas making the case for more rights for co-habiting couples. In his view, the current state of the law, despite the ruling in Stack, does not do enough to help the weaker party (usually the woman) when a relationship comes to an end. In support of this view two points can be made. Firstly, the ruling only applies to situations where the home is registered in the parties' joint names. As such, if the other co-habiting partner is not a joint owner, there is a presumption that they are entitled to 0% of the beneficial interest. Secondly, in order to enforce rights under Stack, the co-habitee would have to resort to the complex law of trusts, rather than the more sensitive provisions of family law.

As someone who profoundly disagrees with the decision in Stack, I simply cannot see the justification for imposing yet more obligations on couples who have expressly declined to enter into marriage with all the legal responsibilities that entails. In my view, where two people choose to live together in a house purchased in joint names, it should not be automatically presumed that they intend to be joint beneficial owners. It is true that if property is purchased in joint names, it is often the intention of the parties to consider themselves to have the property on equal terms. However, this surely only applies during the relationship itself. Once that relationship has come to an end, the very fact of joint registration should not give rise to a presumption of 50% ownership.

It is open to the parties at any time during the relationship to expressly declare themselves to be joint beneficial owners. If they do this, that will be conclusive. The fact that the parties have chosen not to do this should be regarded as compelling evidence that they intend to share the property in some other way. In the absence of such a declaration and marriage, the state has no right to impose these obligations on two adults.

Critics of this view would perhaps claim that such an approach pays insufficient attention to the needs of children of co-habiting partners. However, courts must consider the needs of the children under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, which allows judges to make a number of orders in relation to property where there are young children involved. Indeed, Baroness Deech, Chairman of the Bar Standards Board and senior family lawyer, made this point when responding to Sir Nicholas' comments during the week.

Whatever way one views the debate, it cannot be disputed that if Sir Nicholas' suggestions were implemented, the distinction between marriage and co-habitation would be sharply eroded. If two people wish to enter into a marriage and put their relationship on a firm, legal footing they should be free to do so. If, however, they don't want the legal and social implications that come with marriage, they should be free to live without it. The different regimes involved in the classification of property rights guarantees a significant degree of individual freedom for people to dictate the terms of their family life. It would be wrong of the state to take away this liberty.

Iraq, Regret and Responsibility

Last week saw the re-appearance of Tony Blair in public life for a few hours. The former Prime Minister was answering questions put to him by the members of the Iraq Inquiry, who required him to 'clarify' some of his evidence given last year. Mr Blair's presence before the committee brought out the usual coalition of Islamists, Trots, and Guardian readers, all of whom expressed their disgust at Mr Blair's belated remorse for the war.

Many people felt Mr Blair did not do enough when he first gave evidence to get across how sorry he was for Iraq. Some people want a full and frank apology for his role in the conflict, citing the thousands of Iraqis who 'unnecessarily' died as a result of his actions. Others go further and demand Mr Blair's indictment before the International Criminal Court for war crimes.

One such individual is the former Respect MP, George Galloway. Mr Galloway has consistently opposed the war in Iraq. This is perhaps unsurprising given his previous support for Sadaam Hussein - on one visit to Baghdad Mr Galloway told Sadaam that he 'saluted' his 'strength, courage and indefatigability'.

I'm sure many Iraqis would agree with the description of Sadaam as 'indefatigable'. He was a man who reigned over his people for over 20 years and never for a moment relaxed his repressive grasp on power. Moreover, he led a brutal regime in its persecution of Shi'a Muslims and Kurdish minorities. During the Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds, Sadaam's Government murdered over 180,000 people. Sadaam's victims could pay testament to his indefatigability.

This brings me back to the issue of Mr Blair and his regret for the Iraq war. Should it ever be necessary to regret the overthrow of a fascist, genocidal maniac? There should be a distinction here between the means and the end. Obviously everyone regrets the number of people who died in order to effect regime change in Iraq. Thousands of innocent people were killed as a result of poor planning on behalf of coalition forces; thousands more as a result of poor implementation. Those mistakes should never be forgotten and should always be regretted. However, how can anyone regret the forcing out of one of the world's most repressive, vile dictators?

Not many Guardian columnists stood up to oppose Mr Blair's interventions in Sierra Leone and Kosovo, where British forces saved the lives of thousands of people. So why the difference with Iraq? Surely Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia were sovereign states too? Why should the Iraqi people deserve less protection from genocidal rulers than people in those countries? These are all questions neither Mr Galloway nor Guardian leader writers would be able to answer.

When Mr Galloway appeared on Question Time last week, one of his fellow panellists was the Liberal Democrat MP Simon Hughes, who most people now acknowledge to be the slipperiest man in British politics. Mr Hughes was asked the question I posed a few paragraphs above, namely why we should regret the overthrow of a brutal dictator. His reply was that we shouldn't, but only where that overthrow has been sanctioned by international law. This was a response utterly devoid of thought.

Anyone who has ever stumbled across international law will know that it doesn't really work. Jurisprudential scholars agree that in order for something to be a law, it must be clear and socially effective. Neither of these things can be said about international law. Where is my proof? Firstly, no-one really knows whether it was necessary to obtain a second UN resolution before invading Iraq. Lawyers of the most senior stature disagree. Therefore, it can hardly be said that international law is clear. Secondly, the UN Security Council system allows any one of five (yes five) countries to veto military action. These countries include China and Russia, neither of whom are exactly beacons of tolerance, democracy and freedom. As a result, there is a very real chance that intervention in countries where there has been genocide or crimes against humanity will fall foul of international law. This being the case, how can it be said that international law is socially effective?

If you were to take Mr Hughes' view through to its logical conclusion, the international community could be faced with a situation where it is illegal to take action against states who perpetually murder and violate the dignity of their people. I'm not too keen on this. In my view, whenever a country has the economic and military means to effect regime change in countries that follow such a course of conduct, it should do so, 'legally' or 'illegally'. International law did not serve the people of Iraq, Rwanda or Bosnia that well.

So in conclusion, it is right that Mr Blair should have regrets about the Iraq war. However, those regrets should be about the planning and implementation of the campaign. They should never be about the outcome of the war: the overthrow of a menacing, vile, murderous dictator. The day that civilised people demand such regrets is the day we lose all sense of morality and principle.

Why Prisoners Must Get the Vote

David Cameron has described the thought of prisoners being able to vote in UK General Elections as making him 'physically ill'. No doubt a lot of people would share his disgust. The thought does not exactly fill me with joy either. Despite this, there are very important reasons why the franchise should be extended to those behind bars.

The first is based on the concept of human rights. Human rights are by definition universal. They apply to all human beings. They are non-delegable and they cannot be waived. Why not? Because you can't stop being human. The fact that you may have committed the most serious, violent criminal offence does not disqualify you from being a human. It might disqualify you from being a decent human, but it doesn't change the basic fact.

Therefore, everyone is entitled to human rights, even criminals. We accept that criminals cannot be tortured. Furthermore, we accept that prisoners are entitled to fair trials. We allow offenders to get married and to practise freedom of religion. The big question, then, is whether the right to vote should properly be seen as a 'human right'.

This is a matter of debate. It is arguable that voting should be viewed as a civil or constitutional right, extended by law by a state to its citizens. The effect of this would be to say that the North Korean Government does not violate the human rights of its people when it denies them the opportunity to elect their leaders. One would be suggesting that the North Korean Government merely violates civil or political rights.

The opposite view is that the right to elect a government is a basic human right. In support of this, it is possible to argue that without democratic freedom, a person cannot truly be 'free' at all. If one is not given the opportunity to vote in elections, one remains in a state of perpetual subjugation. The social contract an individual is born into with society involves an implicit understanding that when the government of the day takes decisions with public resources that proves to be unacceptable, that individual has the ability to replace the government. If this were not so, the social contract would be an illegitimate tool of oppression by the political classes.

It is to this view that I subscribe. The right to vote in elections should be considered to be a fundamental, unalienable human right. That is why I, like many others, find it so disturbing when I see the wishes of people in places like Zimbabwe, China, Iran, and North Korea continuously treated with contempt.

Once the right to vote in elections has been established as a human right, the case for allowing prisoners to access the ballot box is unanswerable. Public opinion is irrelevant. That is why human rights are enshrined in law. If there was no binding protection for human rights in the UK, the government of the day could pick and choose which freedoms to guarantee and which to abandon. This is plainly incompatible with the notion of 'human rights' and justifies the position of unelected judges upholding such rights in a democratic society.

The other, more practical, reason why prisoners must get the vote is cost. Every day the UK Government fails to pay prisoners who have brought claims under the European Convention on Human Rights, the taxpayer incurs serious financial penalties. Given the precarious position of the public purse, this is a mounting debt the Exchequer can ill afford. The bill for claims currently stands at £35 million. As troubling as the thought of prisoners voting is, it is arguably less problematic than the prospect of convicted offenders enriching themselves at the expense of law-abiding UK citizens.

So for these reasons, it is imperative that Parliament complies with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights and changes the law. The UK is one of the only countries in Europe that has a blanket ban on prisoners voting. If we have any respect for human rights and the rule of law in general, we should grit our teeth and bite the bullet.

VAT and all that

George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, decided to give the economy the new year's boost it needs today by raising the rate of VAT by 2.5%. In doing so he proved his coalition colleague, Nick Clegg, correct when he warned before the election of a Tory 'VAT Bombshell' if they were returned to office.

Mr Osborne, like Mr Clegg has on so many occasions in the past few months, attempted to justify this seemingly regressive, unhelpful, policy by pointing to its 'progressive' qualities, saying it would be a fairer alternative to other measures. In doing so he was partly supported by research from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), which highlighted the fact that those with the most limited means tend to spend less on the majority of items subject to VAT.

The problem with a rise in VAT, however, is that it reduces the purchasing power of those on lower incomes. Research clearly demonstrates that the poorest bracket of the population in terms of household income will lose disproportionately more from this policy. When it comes to decisions as to whether or not to buy certain consumer goods, those struggling to make ends meet will increasingly decline to take the plunge. This is bad for the poor, whose quality of living decreases further.

Moreover, it is bad for the economy as a whole. Every time people spend money on things like televisions and computers, the shop they buy them from makes money. The more money the shop makes, the more employees they can afford to hire. The more employees they hire, the more those employees spend in other shops. And so on. Discouraging people from purchasing is not good economics. It's especially damaging given the weak growth projections for the UK economy following Osborne's cuts package.

If it has any sense, the coalition will execute one of its now famous U-turns before the rise starts to pour further misery on British retailers. Given the unfortunate timing of this tax rise, coinciding with the start of the Oldham by-election campaign, Mr Clegg may well have a word in Mr Cameron's ear.

Justice and the Paparazzi

One requirement of an aspiring barrister is to gain experience of the profession through 'mini-pupillages'. These involve shadowing barristers for a period of time (usually a week) when they go to court. This week I am completing a placement at a criminal chambers in London. Today I was despatched to the City and Westminster Magistrates' Court to witness a basic drugs case. All very ordinary, you might think.

Little did I know that the City and Westminster Magistrates' Court happened to be the venue for the latest episode in the most high-profile litigation in the UK.

I arrived at the court expecting to encounter the usual bunch of over-worked lawyers and weary criminals. What I actually saw was a flock of photographers and journalists surrounding the entrance. When I asked someone why there was so much commotion, she muttered something about there being a famous person in court that day. After more enquiries I soon realised that the famous person in question was none other than the Wikileaks founder, Julian Assange.

Mr Assange is the subject of extradition proceedings being conducted by the Swedish Government. He is wanted in Sweden in connection with a series of sexual assaults. Supporters of Mr Assange have claimed that the allegations against him are bogus and merely designed to facilitate his eventual extradition to the United States, where there are calls for him to be prosecuted in relation to his role in exposing a huge number of confidential diplomatic cables.

Outside the court, his followers made their views clear. While I was waiting in the queue in order to see the hapless drug offender receive his sentence, the assembled press went crazy as a number of B-list celebrities arrived to support Mr Assange. Firstly, the wealthy socialite Jemima Khan arrived on scene. She was followed by the film director Ken Loach and the veteran journalist John Pilger. All of these noble-minded spirits offered to help Mr Assange with the costs of any bail conditions to the tune of £240,000.

Mr Pilger declared the charges against Mr Assange as 'outrageous' - a curious statement given that he was not present in the bedroom when Mr Assange is alleged to have assaulted these women. Mrs Khan said that she was there to support the 'human right to freedom of information', which does not exist and even if it did, has no application to the case.

Sweden does not appear to have any particular interest in the Wikileaks saga. In order for the critics to be right, therefore, the Swedish Government must be acting as lackeys of the US. This was certainly the implication given by the protesters outside the court, parroting the usual view that the US is the root of all evil in the world. In my opinion, this is clearly absurd. Sweden is no more likely than the UK to extradite Mr Assange to the United States. Even if he was extradited, it is highly unlikely a prosecution would succeed across the pond given the very strict approach taken to freedom of expression. Also, I'm not aware of any particular special relationship that would lead Sweden to deliberately falsify charges to suit the political objectives of the US.

Not that any of this rationality bothered the press, of course.

It's not every day that suspects accused of sexual offences get such vociferous public support. Personally, I find Wikileaks to be an arrogant and counter-productive organisation, which has no concept of long-term public good. Others see it as a revolutionary exponent of corruption and lies at the heart of government. Whatever view one has, however, the fact is that Mr Assange has been accused of sexual offences against a number of women in Sweden. He ought to be made to answer those charges, just as any other suspect being brought before the City and Westminster Magistrates' Court should.

Why he deserves the backing of people like Peter Tatchell or the representation of top human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson QC in this matter is questionable. These advantages were - needless to say - not extended to the defendant in the case I witnessed. There is a lesson here to criminals everywhere - undermine democratic governments and gain the support of activists, lawyers and celebrities. Doesn't matter what you may have done.